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Feminism and the Language of Judging*
Judith Resnik**
Richard Epstein has spoken about how the language of law and
economics might inform a discussion about judging. I am going to talk
about how the language of feminism might inform a conversation about
judging. Thereafter, you (the audience) and our co-panelist judges will
be able to assess the degree to which these two languages, which are
quite different, conform to an understanding of what the activity of
judging is about.
I begin with a description of the conventions of judging, as currently
understood in the United States-a description of what is expected
from judges and of how the law talks about its aspirations for judges.
It is easy to set out such a description. Judges are expected to be
"impartial," "independent," "disengaged," "dispassionate." Federal
statutes, constitutional interpretation, judicial canons, and state law
agree: bias is forbidden. Judges may have no personal, direct, financial
stakes in cases.
These aspirations are, at one level, well worth celebrating; we know
about the capacity for governments to attempt to intrude upon and
seek to undermine judicial independence. In the United States federal
courts, some 20070 to 40070 of civil litigation involves cases in which the
United States is a party. Federal judges therefore often sit in judgment
of their employer, the United States, the very entity that gives them
the jurisdiction froin which to speak at all. We hope that our judges
will have the willingness to "speak truth to power,"l to judge their
governments. So we talk about independence in part because of a fear
that sovereigns will attempt to still or alter the voices of judges.
• These comments are taken from my essay, On the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations of
the Aspirations for Our Judges, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1877 (1988). I appreciate the assistance of
the editors of the Arizona State Law Journal and their willingness to permit me to depart from
legal footnote conventions and to provide the first and last names of authors. Using only last
names not only limits access (when authors have common names) and often relies upon reader
recognition of those already well-known, but also assumes that gender is irrelevant.
•• Orrin B. Evans Professor of Law, University of Southern California.
1. Robert M. Cover, The Folktales of Justice: Tales of Jurisdiction, 14 CAP. U.L. REv.
179, 190 (1985) ("For that ultimate purpose~speaking truth to power-there must be a jurisdiction
of the judge which the [government] cannot share. Of).
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The' law also speaks about· judicial dispassion, disengagement, and
disinterest. As is all too familiar, judges have enormous powers-the
potential to imprison individuals, to change lives, to order: that assets
be transferred from A to B, to compel obedience, and to inflict pain.
We are very concerned that such powers not be used in a self-directed
and self-interested manner. So we talk about the need for judicial
disinterest. We also may, by speaking of judicial disengagement, hope
to enable judges tq judge, to have the capacity to make decisions that,
in fact, will inflict violence and pain. Yet another reason for the
language of disengagement may come from some hope that judges are
somewhat mystical "others," that they are not "us" and, therefore,
that we are being judged by individuals with super qualities. This s~nse
of judges as "others" may give some psychological comfort. In short,
the terms of discussion in the United States-impartiality, freedom
from bias, prejudgment, disint~rest, dispassion-are readily understand-
able (albeit culturally bound).
But. There are two "buts." The first is that there is a substantial
gap between the stated aspirations for judges and some of the rules in
practice. In practice, we do let judges make some decisions about cases
to which they have some degree ·of connection, involvement, and
interest. The second "but," to which I will return in a moment, is that
these aspirations may themselves be too limited.
A couple quick examples from the federal courts of the first problem:
the distance between theory and practice. If a litigant wants to seek to
disqualify a judge because of a claim of impermissible connection to a
case, that litigant must ask the judge who is challenged to recuse herself
or himself. Recall the stated legal aspiration: no person shall be a judge
in a case in which he or she has an interest. Yet, federal statutes require
litigants to ask the very judge challenged to judge his or her capacity
to adjudicate. I am not saying that every time a judge is challenged in
a motion fot disqualification that a judge cares. But reported cases
indicate that there are some instances when judges speak of themselves
as personally distressed at the suggestion that they are not sufficiently
disinterested, and yet have not themselves stepped aside.
Several rationales are offered for the requirement that the challenged
judge decide the motion. One is that such a rule is an attempt to create
a disincentive to challenging a judge, so that fewer of these claims are
made. Another aspect is economy; the judge who is challenged ,has
information about the alleged impermissible qualities. A third argument
found in the literature is that it would somehow be "unseemly" for
the challenged judge to have to explain himself to another person. The
idea is that such testimony is not very "judge-like," for judges should
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not be forced to step down from their position of power and be turned
into witnesses.
A second example of the gap between practice and the stated aspi-
rations is, in the federal system, something called the "rule of neces-
sity." This "rule" comes into play when a judge says: Under ordinary
rules of disqualification, I, the judge, would be disqualified, but indeed,
so would all other judges. Thus, because it is "nec~ssary" that someone
judge, I will. The classic example is a Supreme Court case called United
States v. Wilf.2 Congress had given a cost of living increase to the
federal judiciary and su,bsequently voted a decrease. Judges claimed
that the decrease unconstitutioQally diminisped judici~ compensation,
in violation pf Article III of the Constitution. The question would thus
affect federal jud~es' salaries. At the time the case was litigated, a
f~deral statute required that, if a judge had even a penny at stake i!J,
a case, that ju,dge could not sit on that case.3 Further, Supreme Court
cases had also said that, as a matter of due process, judges could not
sit on cases in Which they had even attenuated financial interests. Yet;
federal judges decided Will. They said they h~d to and that they
could-by virtue of the "rule of necessity." In short, judges with direct
. '
financial stakes in the outcome sometimes decide cases.
My point here is not simply one of deconstruction, of the gaps
between reality and theory. My concern is th~t the aspirations as stated
are incomplete and inaccurate. Further, when one turns to feminist
theory, one can learn a good deal about what might be missing in the
conversatiop. about judging. To illustrate how feminist theory might
help, I will use examples from areas other than law. Many theorists
think about people who hold power, who are judge-like in the sense
that they have power over others. Feminist theologians, feminist political
scientists, and feminist psychologists have all considered people who
are powerful; I will use brief examples from some of these works-
starting with theology.
Theology is a complicated issue for feminists, because, as Gerta
Lerner reminds us, Christian-Judaic monotheism conceptualizes the
universe as created by a single force, God's will.4 Further, God cove-
nanted and contracted, but only with men. How then do feminist
theologians respond? One example is Rosemary Ruether, a Christian
2. 449 U.S. 200 (1980).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1988), with the addition of subsection (0, now permits judges with de
minimis financial interests' to divest themselves of that interest and to continue to preside. [d.
4. GERTA LERNER, THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY 200 (1986).
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theologian, who describes the male monotheistic tradition as based on
a social hierarchy: God, men, women. Ruether also writes about one
response, within both Judaism and Christianity, to attempt to add a
little bit of the female to the male. In the terms of this symposium, to
add "compassion"-for example, the image of Mary as a mediating
force arguing that Jesus temper judgment with mercy. Another example
comes from the Jewish concept called "Shekhinah," sometimes defined
as the feminine presence of God.
Rosemary Ruether rejects these efforts at what she calls divine
androgyny. She makes the point that, in these descriptions, we women
are always the secondary, the mediating, the compassionate but sub-
ordinate force. In her views, this role is limiting, permitting only that
females act as mediators, as the recipients of divine power. "[S]he can
be God's daughter, the bride of the [male] soul .... But she can never
represent divine transcendence in all fullness. "5 Not only does Ruether
reject an androgynous God, she also rejects God portrayed as the
mother. Ruether is not particularly interested in perpetuating the im-
agery of God the creator and the validator of existing hierarchical
social structure; rather Ruether wants to think more about a God
concerned with equality. A patriarchal theology with a parent image is
none too appealing, for it always makes us children. Moving from God
the king. to God the queen, from God the dad to God the mom, does
not respond to her criticism. '
A second feminist theorist is the political philosopher, Sara Ruddick.
In contrast to Ruether, Sara Ruddick is quite interested in images of
parenting and particularly images of mothering. Ruddick explains that
mothering has been relegated outside the political sphere to the private
arena. Ruddick proposes that we think about mothering, a complicated
task in which one is extremely powerful, indeed life-giving, and yet
also powerless. Mothers cannot prevent children from becoming ill,
cannot protect children from wars, social disease, and violence. Ruddick
proposes that we talk about the qualities of mothering in the context
of the political world; she proposes, with some hesitation, something
she describes as "maternal thinking," which she has used as both the
title of an article and a book that has recently been published.6
Ruddick writes about how child-raising entails both efforts at pres-
ervation and at promoting growth, and that these goals are often in
tension. Preservation, protective behavior, may well inhibit growth;
efforts at excessive control can be a problem. Hence, in mothering,
5. ROSEMARY RUETHER, SEXISM AND GOD-TALK: TOWARD A FEMINIST THEOLOGY 61 (1983).
6. SARA RUDDICK, MATERNAL THINKING 23-27 (1989); Sara Ruddick, Maternal Thinking, 6
FEMINIST STUD. 342, 346-48 (1980).
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there is constantly a sense of one's own profound limitations, of the
unpredictability of the consequences of one's work, of enormous power,
and of powerlessness. For Ruddick, mothering is not a biological or
gendered category, but a social category that she proposes could usefully
be brought to the political sphere.
Thus, two snippets of feminist theory. It should be clear from these
brief summaries that feminist theory is not of a piece. For example,
Rosemary Ruether does not embrace the concept of mothering as a
vehicle for understanding, while Sara Ruddick proposes that we use
such a concept. But there is also some degree of continuity. Feminists
talk in a language that is quite different from the language of judging.
These two feminists are interested in interconnections, in gods and
mothers in relationship to others. These feminists talk about power in
light of humility, power and yet the absence of control, and the
difficulties engendered by being both powerful and powerless.
Now return to the language of judging in law. "Disinterest," "dis-
engagement," "impartiality," "independence" -these are all terms
deeply suspicious of relatedness and of relationship. Law talks about
disengagement but does not talk about the degree to which judges are
engaged, dependent, and connected. How might such language affect
our conversations around judging?
First of all, as both a litigator and as a teacher of procedure and
adjudication, I am constantly struck by the dependence of judges. In
my experience as a litigator, judges are not out there, rushing to make
decisions; they are not slayingstatutes willy-nilly. They are not running
amok, they are not reaching for constitutional grand theory. In my
experience, sometimes the problem is persuading judges to decide. I do
not here refer only to waiting for the decision, but also to the range
of doctrinal reasons, such as deference and comity to other institutions,
that result in a refusal to decide. Alternative dispute resolution is
another vehicle of non-decision; judges suggest that parties settle a case
in lieu of the court adjudicating a case. Thus, the discussion of
unrestrained judges is often out of sync with the experience of litigating
cases.
Such discussion is also, at least some judges report, out of sync with
their experience as judges. A few years ago, Patricia Wald, Chief Judge
of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, was on a panel
about judicial restraint. She told her audience that constitutional cases
were, for most judges, "a rarity-gourmet fare, definitely not the bread
and butter of our everyday work lives."7 Her criticism was not simply
7. Patricia Wald, Judicial Review and Constitutional Limitations, 14 GoLDEN GATE V.L.
REv. 645, 650 (1984) (panel discussion).
o
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that much of constitutionaHheory was irrelevant; she told her academic
audience that the experienced reality of judges was that the social
structure pressed them to make decisions on narrow grounds. She urged
academics to have theories of jurisprudence that grow out of the
experience of judges rather than those that are driven by assumptions
at odds with experience.
Recognizing that the act of judging involves routine, daily, difficult,
sometimes not very glamorous, indeed, sometimes boring activity may
help shift our conversation a little bit about judicial restraint. Talking
about how judges are socially and culturally imbedded (and should be)
will help us to recognize that there are not too many "lone rangers"
out there.
With feminist insights, some of the legal rules might change as well.
I began with an example about a disqualification rule that requires a
litigant to· bring a motion to disqualify before the very judge whom
one is seeking to have disqualified. Thinking about this rule from the
point of view of feminist theory, one sees that such a rule is protective
of the hierarchy of judicial power. The idea is that a judge should not
be a "mere" witness; that a judge should not be perceived, like the
rest of us, as having to explain oneself to another. Feminist theory
helps us to appreciate that such a switch in roles-from judge to
witness-:...might indeed be celebrated instead of bemoaned. To let oneself
have to be judged as well as to sit in judgment could provide a glimmer
of what it might be like to enter a courtroom without that protective
veneer of the first name "judge." Being judged occasionally might
enable some degree of understanding of different perspectives. Having
judges also be judged challenges the stability of the hierarchy and
explores the possibility that one can be powerful as well as less powerful
at the same time.
Think also about the "rule of necessity." Again, one can see that
the rule of necessity protects and maintains a hierarchy of power. The
image promoted is of judges as super-judges; here is "God the Father,"
all knowledgeable, unchallengeable. Imagine instead a notion that power
can shift. With research, one can find there are at least seven states
that do not have "rules of necessity." Via either constitutional or
statutory provision, these jurisdictions have a vehicle by which, if every
judge is disqualified on a court, an ad hoc court or judge sits for a
particular case. A wonderful example comes from a Texas case of 1925.
The case involved a fraternal insurance organization called Woodsmen
of the World.8 Apparently all the male judges were members of that
8. Johnson v. Darr, 114 Tex. 516, 272 S.W. 1098 (1925).
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organization. Because all the judges were disqualified, for a bfi.ef
moment the Supreme Court of the State of Texas was comprised of
three women, given the power to judge.
Such stories are not so easy to find. They appear in footnotes or are
noted by little stars or asterisks. We do not have a tradition of reporting
that Judge X is disqualified for a particular reaso~. As Linda Green-
house recently discussed in the New York Times, the United States
Supreme Court does not even docket some of the motions for dis-
qualification.9 We would do well to change this practice, to ac.knowledge
that some judges are disqualified, that there can be s!Jbstitution, and
that there need be no fear in thinking that a judge holds power
intermittently.
In addition, we might talk more about judging as a painful and
difficult activity. In Western art, the visual image of justice is a stoic
woman, who sometimes wears a blindfold and who often holds a scale
and sword. This image captures a fair amount of the power but not
too much of the anguish. to In contrast, a Nigerian statue called the
"Lord of Jurisprudence" is a wooden figure with knives piercing its
chest, and described by one art historian as "an image displaying a
spirit so strong he can wear upon his stalwart chest the painful, intricate
issues of his peoples, symbolized by inserted blades."JI
Perhaps if we talked more about judging as burdensome, complex,
and terrible, we might then talk more about communal modes of
decisionmaking. Many countries have trial judges who sit in groups.
The United States is somewhat odd in having single-judge trial courts.
Yet these days, under efficiency/economy claims, anyone who suggests
adding judges to a trial bench is met with disapproval. If we talk more
about the difficulty of judging, we might consider the need for groups
of judges to work together.
We might also challenge some of the rhetoric of an adversarial system
that suggests that "compassion" is not already a part of the act of
judgment. Compassion is constantly an activity that judges and juries
engage in, often without a vocabulary to describe and discuss it. Of
course judgment is a problem; it engenders pain; it involves a difficult
process; it involves obligation and responsibility. Judgment is an ex-
9. Linda Greenhouse, Questions for a Reticent High Court, N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1989, at
A22, col. 2.
10. See generally Dennis E. Curtis & Judith Resnik, Images of Justice, 96 YALE L.J. 1727
(1987).
11. Robert Thompson, Kongo Power Figure, in PERSPECTIVE: ANGLES ON AFRICAN ART 177,
180 (1987).
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pression of connection of self to others. Thus I suggest that the
aspirations for judges be altered, that we talk about judicial independ-
ence and dependence, disengagement and connection, compassion and
dispassion, and celebrate the dailiness of these activities.
